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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GILBERT N. ANDERSON and 
ELLA B. ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
E VAL ANDERSON 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 9,854 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE: This is an 
action originally pleaded as an action to enforce a for-
feiture of a real estate contract which was submitted 
at the time of trial by stipulation on the question of 
law as to whether or not the contract violated the rule 
against perpetuities. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: The case 
was tried to the Court and from a judgment for the 
Plaintiff declaring the contract void as a violation of 
the rule against perpetuities the Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL: Defendant seeks 
a reversal of the judgment as a matter of law and a 
judgment holding said contract to be valid. 
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THE FACTS: Plaintiffs as sellers and Defendant 
as buyer entered into a real estate contract for the sale 
of a farm, (Exhibit "A") on the 15th day of January, 
1959. Pursuant to the contract Defendant took posses-
sion of the land and farmed the same continuoualy to 
the date of the filing of the action. The contract price 
was $26,564.00 with 4¥2% interest payable in annual 
installments of not less than $1,000.00. Defendant paid 
$500,00 on May 1, 1959; $500.00 on December 1, 1959; 
$1,000.00 on October 1, 1960 and $1,000.00 on October 
1, 1961. The minimum payment did not cover the inter-
est. The buyer has an option to accellerate payments. 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint on August 1, 1962 
claiming that Defendant had defaulted under the con-
tract by failing to make the payments required under 
the contract and asked the Court's assistance to en-
force a forfeiture of the contract. At the trial the 
Plaintiffs changed their approach and rather than 
claiming a forfeiture asked the Court to declare the 
contract null and void as a ·violation of the rule against 
perpetuities. Plaintiffs stipulated that Defendants had 
paid all that was required b~T the contract but claimed 
that the contract which Plaintiffs counsel had prepared 
waf' nevertheless void. 
The effect of the contract is ba3ically that the 
yearly payments provided fall short of pa~Ting the in-
terP~t on the principal. If the miniinuin pay1nents were 
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3 
made the Defendant would be entitled to possession and 
the profits from the land perpetually but the contract 
would not be paid out unless the buyer exercised his 
option to pay sufficiently more on the principal so 
that the payments would more than cover the interest. 
POINT: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION WAS VOID 
BECAUSE IT VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES :-Both parties stipulated that the 
only issue was one of law, to wit: Does the contract vio-
late the rule against perpetuities? There is no issue under 
the pleadings as to whether the contract as it reads 
violated the intent of the parties. We must therefore 
proceed on the basis that the parties intended the con-
tract to have the effect it did; that the parties intended 
that the contract principal would never be paid unless 
Defendant exercised his option to pay more than the 
minimum and that the parties intended that the buyer 
should have the possession and profits as long as he 
paid $1,000.00 a year and otherwise abided by the terms 
of the contract. 
It may well be that if the respondents had claimed 
that the contract violated the intent of the parties they 
might have pursued a remedy of reformation. We must 
conclude that Plaintiffs had their own good reasons 
for not pursuing such a remedy. The result might 
have been a reduction of the interest rate, or some other 
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4 
result consistant with the presumption of construction 
against a party preparing a contract. In this respect, 
it should be noted that it was the appellant and not the 
respondent that attempted to broaden the issue to in-
clude possible reformation. (Page 22 O.R. lines 7 to 10) 
But we face solely the issue of the violation of the rule 
against perpetuities. 
The document, when viewed according to its class-
ification as to legal effect is in essence a lease in per-
petuity with an option to buy rather than a typical real 
estate contract because of the following incidents: The 
buyer or lessee has possession and right to income 
while he is current on his payments but legal title would 
always remain in the seller or lessor unless the buyer 
or lessee exercises his option to pay additional amounts. 
The rule aganist perpetuities as its applies to this 
situation is as follows in -!1 American Jurisprudence: 50. 
''The rule against perpetuities prohibits the cre-
ation of future interests or estates which by pos-
sibility may not becon1e vested with a life or 
lives in being at the effective date of the instru-
ment, and twenty-one years thereafter ... 
"It's usual application and effect is to prohibit 
or invalidate atten1pts to create by limitations. 
whether executorv or hv wav of remainder, 
future interests o~ estate;, the .vesting of which 
is postponed he~~ond the prescribed period." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
It is well settled that perpetual leases do not viol-
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ate the rule against perpetuities. The earliest collec-
tion of cases available on the question of the effect of 
the rule on perpetual leases is found in 3 ALR 498, 
which states as follows: 
"Save in a single instance (1\forrison v. Rossig-
nol-Cal.-infra), it has been generally held that 
perpetual leases and leases containing a covenant 
for perpetual renewal are not violative either 
of the rule against perpetuities or of statute;:; 
limiting the period during which the absolute 
power of alienation may be suspended.'' 
"The reason why a lease containing a covenant 
for perpetual renewal does not contravene the 
rule against perpetuities is that the covenant 
to renew may be taken as part of the lessee';~ 
present interest. ''The rule again3t perpetuities,'' 
says Professor Gray (Perpetuities Section 230), 
''although a strict rule, is yet a practical rule. 
An estate for years with a perpetual covenant 
for renewal is, so far a's questions of remotene~~ 
are concerned, substantially a fee, and as such 
it is regarded." 
''And it is obvious that a perpetual lease, or a 
lease containing a covenant for perpetual re-
newal is not a restraint or limitation upon tlH' 
power of alienation of the fee, for there are at all 
times persons in being who by ;joining ran r:onrey 
the fee." 
''A lease for any number of years, whethPr for 
99 or 999 is not in violation of the Statute of 
Perpetuities for in neither is the lessor precluded 
thereby from dispo3ing of it at will nor the lP~~PP 
hindered in selling or assigning the lease; and hv 
uniting in a conveyance the lessor and lesse.e 
may freely and without restraint convey both 
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the fee and leasehold interest.'' (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
The most recent annotation available is found in 
66 ALR 2nd 733 at page 734 Section 3 the pertinent 
part of which is as follows: 
''In regard to whether or not a perpetual lease, 
or a covenant to renew a lease perpetually, viol-
ates the rule against perpetuities, or any rule 
against suspension of the power of alienation, 
see the annotation in 3 ALR 498, supplemented 
in 162 ALR 1147. 
Clearly, a lease in praesenti for a term to com-
mence at once does not violate the rule against 
perpetuities, whether or not the lease term will 
continue for a time beyond the period allowed 
by such rule for the vesting of interests." 
Said annotation quoting cases reiterates the test as 
follows: 
''So in Re Hubbel (1907) 135 Iowa 637, 113 NW 
152 ,13 LRA NS 496, 14 ANN Cas 640, the Court 
declared, upon the authority of the Todhunter 
Case (Iowa supra, that a lease for any number 
of years, whether for 99 or 999, 'is not in viola-
tion of the statute of perpetuities,' since the le~­
sor is not precluded thereby from disposing of 
the land at will, nor is the lessee hindered in 
selling or assigning the lease, and moreover, by 
uniting in a conveyance the lessor and le::;st>e 
may freely and without restraining convey both 
the fee and leasehold interest." 
The only remaining question, is whether the option 
to buy, which might be exercised anytime during tlH~ 
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period of the lease, violates the rule. It is conceded 
that an option, unconnected with any present interest 
or a lease may, depending upon its provisions, violates 
the rule. But the authorities are in harmony that where 
such option is not in gross but is in connection with 
some present interest and right to immediate possession, 
the mere fact that an option to buy is attached to such 
present interest will not render the document in viola-
tion of the rule. I quote from 41 Am J ur 85 as follows : 
''Where the option to purchase is contained in a 
lease giving the lessee an option to purchase dur-
ing the term of the lease, the eourts take the 
view that the rule against perpetuities does not 
apply.'' 
The following is from Leach and Tudor, The Rule 
Against Perpetuities; Page 145, Section 24.57: 
"In the Fnited States an option to purchase in 
a lease exereisable during or at the end of the 
tenant's term is valid, regardless of the length 
of the lease, aecording to cases which are sup-
ported by Professional opinion. Gray thought 
otherwise, favoring the English cases which holfl 
such an option void if exercisable beyond the 
period of perpetuities. 
Options in a tenant to renew or extend his 1Pa~P, 
even options of perpetual renewal; are not in-
valid under the rule against perpetuities an~·­
where, ineluding England, but options of renew-
al may run afoul of statutes which put a time 
limit on the permissable duration of leases, e.g. 
as in California, ninety-nine years on urban 
leases and sixteen on agricultural leases. 
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Critique. The situation considered in this sec-
tion is the exact opposite of that in the previous 
section. (Options in a person other than a ten-
ant). Improvement of the land is stimulated, 
not retarded, by the existance of an option to 
purchase in the tenant. If the tenant has an op-
tion to purchase, he can safely improve, for by 
the exercise of the option he can preserve to him-
self the benefit of the improvement. If he has 
no option, he cannot economically make an im-
provement which will have a substantial value 
at the termination of the lease. Thus, a ru]e 
which invalidates an option in a tenant for the 
full term of his lease defeats the policy favor-
ing free alienation and full use of property which 
the rule against perpetuities was designed to 
further. The American cases which exempt from 
the Rule Options in a tenant to purchase or to 
renew are sound.'' 
The following is from Simes, Future Interests, Sec-
tion 110; page 381 : 
''The question has also been raised whether or 
not an option inserted in a lease permitting the 
lessee to buy reversions during the term is valid, 
even though it may be exercised at a time beyond 
the period of the rule. It would seem that this 
provision is just as much a commercial device 
as the option to renew the long term lease and 
should be held valid for the same reason. This 
is the conclusion reached bY the .A1nerican De-
cisions; but the English Courts have treated 
this option like any other option to purchase 
and have held it subject to the rule.'' 
There is no basis in the law for holding that the 
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9 
contract in q~estion violates the rule against perpet-
uities. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the District Court should be reversed and the contract 
declared valid and the defendant be allowed to rein-
state himself under said contract and that the defend-
ant be awarded his costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted 
DAINES, THOMAS AND HODGES 
By David R. Daines 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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